Warum Syrien für den Kreml wichtig ist

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2024/12/syria-matters-russia/680858/?utm_source=reddit&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=the-atlantic&utm_content=edit-promo

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    Nicole Grajewski: “Rebel forces swept into Aleppo on Saturday, capturing the city center in a lightning three-day offensive that seemed to show the slackening of Moscow’s grip on Syria. The symbolism was impossible to ignore: The Syrian regime’s brutal reconquest of that very city in 2016 had demonstrated Russia’s military effectiveness. Now Vladimir Putin’s Russia is preoccupied with Ukraine, and Aleppo has slipped from regime control. [https://theatln.tc/2bXmh9l8](https://theatln.tc/2bXmh9l8)  

    “But Russia’s commitment to Syria has not actually wavered, and Russia is not really distracted. The advance of Syria’s rebels, led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), reflects the degradation not of Russian attention but of the multinational ground forces supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. And Russia is not only not contemplating withdrawing from Syria—it looks poised to double down on its investment there, even if it has to rely on Iranian-backed forces and the cooperation of regional powers to do so.

    “Syria is important to Moscow because intervening there in 2015 allowed Putin to reverse the narrative of Russian decline that had taken hold since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia would no longer be what then-President Barack Obama dismissed as a declining ‘regional power’—it was to be a decisive great-power patron of the Assad regime, and as such, it would rewrite the playbook of outside intervention in the Middle East. 

    “… The invasion of Ukraine also changed Moscow’s Middle East posture in another way. Since getting involved in Syria, Moscow had delicately balanced the claims of Iran and Israel. In 2018, it agreed to hold Iranian forces about 50 miles off from the Golan Heights. The invasion of Ukraine began to shift this equilibrium, as Moscow’s reliance on Iranian drones for that war pushed it closer to Tehran’s ‘Axis of Resistance.’

    “None of this seemed like a major problem for Russia until Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. Then, as the conflict in Gaza spilled into the surrounding region, Israel escalated from targeting weapons depots in Syria to systematically eliminating high-value Iranian and Hezbollah assets and personnel there. Russia could no longer remain neutral regarding Israeli strikes while simultaneously deepening its reliance on Iranian-backed ground forces. 

    “… Given the stakes, Moscow will be compelled to adapt rather than withdraw. It will likely seek to strengthen military cooperation with Iran, including by finding a role for Iraqi militias and recruits in Syria. Reports indicate that this is already happening. Iran has also been recruiting on Telegram channels to replenish its Syrian brigades. These reinforcements may help offset Hezbollah’s losses, but they are unlikely to be as effective as the Russian- and Iranian-led campaign that carried out the Aleppo offensive in 2016.

    “… As consuming as the war in Ukraine has been for Russia, the Kremlin does not see it as superseding its Middle East ambitions. That’s because Syria is not just a military outpost. It is a cornerstone of Russia’s claim to great-power status, a theater where it can demonstrate its diplomatic reach and its counternarrative to Western interventionism.”

    Read more: [https://theatln.tc/2bXmh9l8](https://theatln.tc/2bXmh9l8)

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