Stuart E. Eizenstat and Dennis Ross: “The cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah brokered by President Joe Biden’s envoy Amos Hochstein is an important achievement. It reflects the lessons that the two of us have learned in a lifetime of diplomacy and statecraft—and those lessons can be applied to Gaza and the broader Middle East by the Biden administration in its remaining days and by the incoming Trump administration.
“The first lesson is the crucial importance of backing diplomacy with decisive military power and accurate intelligence in order to secure an achievable political objective. As the United States painfully learned in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan, the use of military force divorced from an achievable political outcome is doomed to fail. Force is a tool, not an end in itself.
“Israel’s use of force set the stage for diplomacy by dramatically weakening Hezbollah. After accepting Hezbollah’s imposition of a limited war for nearly a year, the Israel Defense Forces and Mossad acted decisively to decapitate Hezbollah’s leadership; disrupt its command, control, and communications; destroy 80 percent of its rocket forces; and dismantle its weapons stocks and infrastructure—below- and aboveground—that it had built up along Israel’s borders. Israel also retaliated against Iran after its October 1 ballistic-missile attack on Israel, destroying Iran’s strategic air and missile defense and 90 percent of its ballistic-missile-production capability. In doing so, it reminded us once again of Henry Kissinger’s maxim that you can achieve at the negotiating table only what you have won on the battlefield.
“A related lesson of good statecraft is recognizing opportunities and moving quickly to act on them. Timing matters, and the Biden administration recognized that Israel’s military achievements had created an opening to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, working through the Lebanese government. The administration also believed that Iran recognized that Hezbollah’s weakness made it vulnerable to its adversaries in Lebanon and that Iran, not wanting to lose the crown jewel of its Axis of Resistance, would want to end the war.
“Diplomacy also requires good timing. The conflict was not ripe for settlement until Hezbollah and Iran had been sufficiently weakened by Israel’s attacks. Only then was Hezbollah willing to abandon its insistence that ending its missile and drone attacks against Israel would first require a permanent cease-fire in Gaza.
“Additionally, negotiations worked because Israel had clear, limited, and achievable political objectives. The Israelis understood that they could not eliminate Hezbollah; instead, they aimed to ensure that Hezbollah could have no forces south of the Litani River and could not easily rearm there …”
“In Gaza, Israel has also successfully destroyed the military threat posed by an adversary … But unlike in Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah, in which it set more limited goals, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly pledged ‘total victory’ over Hamas. Just as Israel could not eliminate Hezbollah—and the U.S. could not eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan—Israel can defeat Hamas but not eradicate it, as IDF leaders have recognized. Hamas’s ideology has been profoundly destructive to the Palestinian people, and polls show that they know it. Israel now needs to translate its military achievements against Hamas in Gaza into a sustainable political outcome.”
The war in Gaza is not prolonging because no one can figure out a way to end it. It’s stuck going on because all the routes to ending it will cause Netanyahu’s government coalition to collapse. It really is no more complicated than that.
Successful_Ride6920 on
War(s) against Israel will only end when the Arab (Islamic?) world accepts Israel as a Middle Eastern nation, which, in my opinion, will never happen. Therefore, Israel is bound for never-ending war against one Islamic entity or another. If Israel makes Peace with the Sunni Arabs, the Shia’s will fight Israel. If Israel makes peace with the Arabs, the Persians/Turks will fight Israel. My forecast, unfortunately, is the Islamic world to eventually wear down Israel and, once Israel is close to being defeated, the war will go nuclear. The Samson Option is real.
Traditional_Tea_1879 on
I think the main difference between Lebanon and Gaza is the structure of power.
In Lebanon, as the author recognises, there are increasing risks to Hezbulla to lose all its military power and remain as a weak (ish) political wing that is limited by the countries set in the constitution and the not insignificant power held by opposing faction. Furthermore, as a political wing, it has less capacity to set the agenda, enforce worldview and it is more exposed to public opinion. Hezbulla agreement to ceasefire is reflection of their recognition that they are on the verge of losing that influence in Lebanon.
Not so in Gaza. In Gaza, by far, Hamas is the dominant military power, even after more than a year of war with Israel. While it has far less capabilities to carry effective attacks against idf or Israeli civilians, it demonstrate it’s ferocious nature by violence against Gaza citizens and opposing local forces, whether by forcing civilians with violence to stay in war zones, torture and kill vocal opposing voices, execute anyone. Who contest their control on the incoming aid convoys etc.
None of these can be done in Hezbulla in Lebanon.
The public opinion in Gaza is meaningless to Hamas as it can not lead to any substantial change. The one thing that could potentially weaken Hamas is cut from external support and recognizing that the only path forward would be to lay down their arms, however, with continued support from Iran and increasing criticism from the west on Israel operation, they recognise that it is likely that the pressure on Israel will yield at some point an ‘ out of jail’ card that will ensure their continued control and influence in Gaza.
Israel can stop the war now and move on, but that would just set off the clock for the next round.
As for Netanyahu, unfortunately, it does look that his political weakness does not help to finish the war. Wrong decisions, delayed decisions, outrageous comments from his ministers all contributing to criticism against Israel, while his woes with the judiciary system cast doubts on the drivers of these decisions ( or lack off).
4 Comments
Stuart E. Eizenstat and Dennis Ross: “The cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah brokered by President Joe Biden’s envoy Amos Hochstein is an important achievement. It reflects the lessons that the two of us have learned in a lifetime of diplomacy and statecraft—and those lessons can be applied to Gaza and the broader Middle East by the Biden administration in its remaining days and by the incoming Trump administration.
“The first lesson is the crucial importance of backing diplomacy with decisive military power and accurate intelligence in order to secure an achievable political objective. As the United States painfully learned in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan, the use of military force divorced from an achievable political outcome is doomed to fail. Force is a tool, not an end in itself.
“Israel’s use of force set the stage for diplomacy by dramatically weakening Hezbollah. After accepting Hezbollah’s imposition of a limited war for nearly a year, the Israel Defense Forces and Mossad acted decisively to decapitate Hezbollah’s leadership; disrupt its command, control, and communications; destroy 80 percent of its rocket forces; and dismantle its weapons stocks and infrastructure—below- and aboveground—that it had built up along Israel’s borders. Israel also retaliated against Iran after its October 1 ballistic-missile attack on Israel, destroying Iran’s strategic air and missile defense and 90 percent of its ballistic-missile-production capability. In doing so, it reminded us once again of Henry Kissinger’s maxim that you can achieve at the negotiating table only what you have won on the battlefield.
“A related lesson of good statecraft is recognizing opportunities and moving quickly to act on them. Timing matters, and the Biden administration recognized that Israel’s military achievements had created an opening to mediate a cease-fire between Israel and Hezbollah, working through the Lebanese government. The administration also believed that Iran recognized that Hezbollah’s weakness made it vulnerable to its adversaries in Lebanon and that Iran, not wanting to lose the crown jewel of its Axis of Resistance, would want to end the war.
“Diplomacy also requires good timing. The conflict was not ripe for settlement until Hezbollah and Iran had been sufficiently weakened by Israel’s attacks. Only then was Hezbollah willing to abandon its insistence that ending its missile and drone attacks against Israel would first require a permanent cease-fire in Gaza.
“Additionally, negotiations worked because Israel had clear, limited, and achievable political objectives. The Israelis understood that they could not eliminate Hezbollah; instead, they aimed to ensure that Hezbollah could have no forces south of the Litani River and could not easily rearm there …”
“In Gaza, Israel has also successfully destroyed the military threat posed by an adversary … But unlike in Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah, in which it set more limited goals, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly pledged ‘total victory’ over Hamas. Just as Israel could not eliminate Hezbollah—and the U.S. could not eliminate the Taliban in Afghanistan—Israel can defeat Hamas but not eradicate it, as IDF leaders have recognized. Hamas’s ideology has been profoundly destructive to the Palestinian people, and polls show that they know it. Israel now needs to translate its military achievements against Hamas in Gaza into a sustainable political outcome.”
Read more here: [https://theatln.tc/FWsgFT0K](https://theatln.tc/FWsgFT0K)
The war in Gaza is not prolonging because no one can figure out a way to end it. It’s stuck going on because all the routes to ending it will cause Netanyahu’s government coalition to collapse. It really is no more complicated than that.
War(s) against Israel will only end when the Arab (Islamic?) world accepts Israel as a Middle Eastern nation, which, in my opinion, will never happen. Therefore, Israel is bound for never-ending war against one Islamic entity or another. If Israel makes Peace with the Sunni Arabs, the Shia’s will fight Israel. If Israel makes peace with the Arabs, the Persians/Turks will fight Israel. My forecast, unfortunately, is the Islamic world to eventually wear down Israel and, once Israel is close to being defeated, the war will go nuclear. The Samson Option is real.
I think the main difference between Lebanon and Gaza is the structure of power.
In Lebanon, as the author recognises, there are increasing risks to Hezbulla to lose all its military power and remain as a weak (ish) political wing that is limited by the countries set in the constitution and the not insignificant power held by opposing faction. Furthermore, as a political wing, it has less capacity to set the agenda, enforce worldview and it is more exposed to public opinion. Hezbulla agreement to ceasefire is reflection of their recognition that they are on the verge of losing that influence in Lebanon.
Not so in Gaza. In Gaza, by far, Hamas is the dominant military power, even after more than a year of war with Israel. While it has far less capabilities to carry effective attacks against idf or Israeli civilians, it demonstrate it’s ferocious nature by violence against Gaza citizens and opposing local forces, whether by forcing civilians with violence to stay in war zones, torture and kill vocal opposing voices, execute anyone. Who contest their control on the incoming aid convoys etc.
None of these can be done in Hezbulla in Lebanon.
The public opinion in Gaza is meaningless to Hamas as it can not lead to any substantial change. The one thing that could potentially weaken Hamas is cut from external support and recognizing that the only path forward would be to lay down their arms, however, with continued support from Iran and increasing criticism from the west on Israel operation, they recognise that it is likely that the pressure on Israel will yield at some point an ‘ out of jail’ card that will ensure their continued control and influence in Gaza.
Israel can stop the war now and move on, but that would just set off the clock for the next round.
As for Netanyahu, unfortunately, it does look that his political weakness does not help to finish the war. Wrong decisions, delayed decisions, outrageous comments from his ministers all contributing to criticism against Israel, while his woes with the judiciary system cast doubts on the drivers of these decisions ( or lack off).