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2 Comments
[SS from essay by Jeffrey Ding, Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and the author of [*Technology and the Rise of Great Powers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition*](https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691260341/technology-and-the-rise-of-great-powers) (Princeton University Press), from which this essay is adapted.]
Chinese analysts are not alone in thinking this way about technological innovation and power. U.S. policymakers also see a vital link. In his first press conference after taking office, President Joe Biden underscored the need to “own the future” as it relates to competition in emerging technologies, pledging that China’s goal to become “the most powerful country in the world” was “not going to happen on my watch.” In 2018, Congress set up the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, a body that convened government officials, technology experts, and social scientists to study the implications of AI. Comparing AI’s possible impact to earlier innovations such as electricity, the commission’s final report warned that the [United States](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/united-states) would soon lose its technological leadership to China if it did not adequately prepare for the “AI revolution.”
Many good points. However, the enumeration of how diffusion mattered more in earlier industrial revolutions doesn’t account for the third revolution (information). The money-printing Big Tech companies, almost all of them American, have converted their early lead in innovation in IT into nearly impenetrable power. Even though there are benefits to businesses to adopt IT, a good chunk of those benefits convert into revenue for a handful of American companies.
In terms of geopolitics, haven’t China been somewhat successful in using the “Great Chinese Firewall” to grow their own tech companies, while imposing their preferred information “hygiene”? The European approach of suing Big Tech and posting hysterical open letters on Twitter about it is hardly doing much than adding friction to information handling in Europe, further degrading European businesses.
The Third Information Revolution was the first to see companies with the world as their addressable market. Aren’t we looking at a similar competition this time? That is: get hold of as much training data and compute power as possible and that way localize the owners of the top AI models within your borders and collect revenue from the world.
To argue against my position, I think the diffusion of simpler AI models that are already in the public domain can already do a great deal to a country’s global position. However, if we believe in the bull case for AI, then the models we have today will soon be obsolete since future leading-edge models are going to be so enormously capable that one cannot afford *not* to use them.