US-Geheimdienste gingen fälschlicherweise davon aus, dass es zu einer Eskalation der IDF gegen die Hisbollah kommen würde

American assumptions on Ukraine were also quite consistently wrong, including “escalation risk”, “managed” in a way which put things where they are now. I think the failure (on the Israeli side as well) wasn’t an overestimation of Hezbollah but rather an underestimation of Israel’s capabilities against Hezbollah. The most crucial of these capabilities were known to very few, and this underestimation likely grew in the U.S. after the October 7 failure.

The biggest of mistakes is imagining that Putin would use nuclear weapons on a neighboring state. They played into Putin’s hands and refused to give Ukraine the necessary support at the right time to win the war. That was foolish of them – there was never a threat of escalation, in fact if they gave Ukraine deadly weapons prior to the war, it would have been sufficient to either deter the war or leave Russian desolate.