Wargaming zur nuklearen Abschreckung und ihre Misserfolge im Konflikt zwischen den USA und China um Taiwan

The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) conducted war-gaming to better understand nuclear dynamics in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. This topic is interesting because you don’t hear much discussion on nuclear weapons regarding a China conflict, unlike for a Russia conflict.

A subset of the results and recommendations from the Executive Summary is below.

**Results**

15 games were played with the following outcomes:

* PLA Phased Withdrawal (5 outcomes): A ceasefire with a People’s Republic of China (PRC) withdrawal from Taiwan and the return of Chinese prisoners of war (POWs).
* PRC Enclave (5 outcomes): A ceasefire with the establishment of a PRC enclave on Taiwan.
* Conflagaration (3 outcomes): Strategic nuclear exchange with millions of casualties.
* Status Quo Ante (1 outcome): Destruction of Chinese forces on Taiwan but no Taiwanese independence.
* Inconclusive (1 outcome): No settlement or nuclear conflagration by the end of gameplay.

In twelve games, China teams experienced a crisis as their invasion forces faced defeat on Taiwan. Seven games saw China teams recommending nuclear use. No set of circumstances allowed a complete U.S. coalition or Chinese victory. All victories were partial.

**Recommendations**

The greatest pressure for nuclear weapons use came from imminent conventional defeat. In seven of eight cases of nuclear use, China teams employed nuclear weapons first when they were facing conventional defeat on Taiwan and decided to gamble for resurrection; the only other case of nuclear use was by one U.S. team when it mistakenly believed it was losing the conflict.

Summary recommendations:

* Prepare off-ramps for a conflict with China.
* Do not preclude the U.S. military from striking the Chinese mainland with conventional weapons.
* Do not pursue quantitative nuclear superiority with the expectation that it will deter China from using nuclear weapons.
* Accustom U.S. military and political leaders to the possibility of large initial losses in the event of a war with China.
* Continue extended deterrence messaging.
* Develop an understanding with Japan on the nuclear environment.
* Develop nuclear branch plans for Chinese operational targets.
* Do not develop additional nuclear weapons for a conflict with China beyond current nuclear modernization plans.
* Rebalance nuclear inventories over time, from gravity bombs to air-launched cruise missiles.
* Work with China to facilitate mutual understanding about deterrence and the unpredictability of nuclear escalation.