SS: For more than a decade, the United States’ Asia policy has been consumed with one issue: the rise of China. President Joe Biden’s views did not fully align with those of President Barack Obama, and both men had many differences with Donald Trump. But all three fretted about what China, as a great power, might do to its region and to the world. They have, accordingly, oriented Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy around partnerships and policies that can constrain Beijing.
But China is not the only rising power in Asia. The continent is also home to India: another nuclear-armed country with a huge population, army, and economy. And like China, India has a regional reputation for hegemonic behavior. Yet the United States hardly considers the possibility that India might pose a challenge of its own. Instead, American officials have reached out to India as a partner and encouraged its rise, hoping New Delhi will amass enough power to counterbalance Beijing. They seem to want India to become a regional power, perhaps even something akin to a “third pole” in the global order.
American officials should consider a more complex strategy. New Delhi is a valuable partner in many domains, including the competition with Beijing. But India is notoriously intransigent in world politics. Its behavior on the global stage sometimes worries even those countries that want or need to develop friendly relations with it. Should India acquire the heft to become, as U.S. officials hope, a true counterbalance to China, it will likely also consider itself a counterbalance to the United States. In short, a tripolar world, with India as the third pole, will not strengthen Washington’s or Beijing’s hand. Instead, it will produce a more unstable global dynamic.
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SS: For more than a decade, the United States’ Asia policy has been consumed with one issue: the rise of China. President Joe Biden’s views did not fully align with those of President Barack Obama, and both men had many differences with Donald Trump. But all three fretted about what China, as a great power, might do to its region and to the world. They have, accordingly, oriented Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy around partnerships and policies that can constrain Beijing.
But China is not the only rising power in Asia. The continent is also home to India: another nuclear-armed country with a huge population, army, and economy. And like China, India has a regional reputation for hegemonic behavior. Yet the United States hardly considers the possibility that India might pose a challenge of its own. Instead, American officials have reached out to India as a partner and encouraged its rise, hoping New Delhi will amass enough power to counterbalance Beijing. They seem to want India to become a regional power, perhaps even something akin to a “third pole” in the global order.
American officials should consider a more complex strategy. New Delhi is a valuable partner in many domains, including the competition with Beijing. But India is notoriously intransigent in world politics. Its behavior on the global stage sometimes worries even those countries that want or need to develop friendly relations with it. Should India acquire the heft to become, as U.S. officials hope, a true counterbalance to China, it will likely also consider itself a counterbalance to the United States. In short, a tripolar world, with India as the third pole, will not strengthen Washington’s or Beijing’s hand. Instead, it will produce a more unstable global dynamic.