Der Preis eines schlechten Friedens

Ukraine and the West will soon find themselves negotiating with Russia to define the terms of a settlement—and, by extension, shaping a new world order. This emerging order will not be the rules-based system established after World War II, but one driven by idiosyncratic dealmaking among strongmen.

The Putin that the West would face at the negotiating table is a former underdog—a man on a mission to free the world from what he has characterized as Western “hegemony,” his economy thriving, his new and old friends paying court, and his people unified behind him. He is not, however, as invincible as he seems.

The West, meanwhile, will be negotiating from a position of inherent weakness. After tiptoeing around the Kremlin’s red lines throughout the war, Western leaders have signaled their readiness to consider cessation of a large chunk of Ukrainian territory, wishing away what little leverage they had.

There is nothing stopping Putin from believing that he can’t get more. Unless Russia is decisively defeated on the battlefield or Putin is given precisely what he wants, he will not stop.

Of the options put forward for a negotiated solution, the only one that Putin would agree to is the one that gives him Ukraine’s capitulation on a platter. He will never agree to a thriving, independent, armed, and Western-aligned Ukraine on his border, because he would lose too much face. Putin will therefore demand an unviable Ukraine—without an army and without NATO membership—and, in effect, a Western surrender.

By Anastasia Edel, a writer and social historian.