Howdy folks. It’s been a few days since we last visited Donetsk Oblast and the situation hasn’t improved.
>Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
Damn, ISW, no lube no nothing. They just rammed that paragraph home.
All right, so shit’s fucked. Now I guess it’s a question of degrees. Reading further I would describe the situation as “slightly fucked”, not totally, nor even close to totally, but the situation in Donetsk Oblast is deteriorating and it’s doing so without some corresponding development. IE: there isn’t a reason why Ukraine should be retreating, such as a shortage of artillery shells or a delay of Western aid, so the fact that they are speaks to a deeper underlining problem with the Ukrainian armed forces. I hate to say it, but Russia may be gaining the upper hand in Donetsk Oblast.
Why, ISW? Why is this happening?
>Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024.
Ukraine’s defenses are mostly ad-hoc and a result of location they find themselves at any given point in the line. They didn’t choose the ground they’re holding, they were pushed to it, so their defenses aren’t like the Surovikhin Line or the Maginot Line. They’re what Ukraine could throw together when pressed. And there are holes, sometimes big sometimes small, and it’s these holes Russia is exploiting to gain small tactical advantages. Enough of these tactical advantages add up and they become strategic threats.
What sort of strategic threat? Well it all has to do with the Kurakhove salient. Kurakhove is a Ukrainian redoubt northeast of Vuhledar and west of Donetsk. [To follow along for the next section I recommend the ISW’s interactive map.](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) It’ll make your life easier.
>Threat One: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing the area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka.
Russia is going around by targeting Rozdolne, a tiny hamlet to the northeast. Its fall would present three realities.
1. The fall of Rozdolne threatens the envelopment of Velyka Novosilka, potentially necessitating its retreat.
2. Rozdolne acts as the gateway to the H-15 highway.
3. Rozdolne straddles the T-05-18 road feeding into Velyka Novosilka. Its loss would make supplying Velyka Novosilka far more difficult.
Of the two I think threatening the H-15 highway is the more pressing threat. It feeds Kurakhove and Russia gaining control of it would necessitate the retreat of everything east of Andriivka.
Speaking of Andriivka.
>Threat Two: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline.
Russia wouldn’t have to fight all the way to Andriivka to force a retreat out of Kurakhove. Just taking Roslyv, a little to the south, would gain them control over the H-15 highway and put any defense to the east on extremely tenuous footing.
That said, there’s a reason Russia hasn’t been successful in these efforts before, and it’s because the path to Andriivka is covered in mines. It would be extremely difficult for the Russian army to cross such open terrain, and the coming winter storms will turn the fields to a muddy soup. Armored vehicles are likely to remain useless in such conditions.
But if the south fails there’s always a pincer from the north.
>Threat Three: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes.
This one I think is the least likely threat. Getting to Andriivka requires cutting through several hamlets, from a single vector of attack, to lay siege to a large settlement. If they ever come close to threatening Andriivka, Ukraine will have pulled out of Kurakhove and collapsed the pocket themselves.
>The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances
Small Russian advances are to be expected. Ukraine isn’t attacking, only defending, so the story will always be one of gradual retreat. It’s the nature of a purely defensive strategy.
Ukraine’s win condition is and always has been the destruction of the Russian state. This corrosive strategy they’ve adopted is meant to optimize the ratio of damage, to trade meterage for lives and treasure, and that doesn’t mean squandering strength over pointless attacks. When Ukraine yields a town, it’s often destroyed, little better than a field in terms of tactical utility. There’s no point in dying to reclaim it.
This war will end when Russia is unable to prosecute it further. Putin will either run out of people, or tanks, or his financial state will collapse. Those are Ukraine’s win conditions, and all signs point to Ukraine getting close. Russia is at max employment; Russian interest rates are 21%; and Russia’s Soviet-era stockpiles are running dangerously low. Keep hope. Ukraine will win this war.
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>Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Head off the Department of Combating Crimes Committed in Conditions of Armed Conflict, Yuri Bilousov, reported on November 1 that Russian forces have executed at least 109 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that Russian forces have intensified the number of POW executions they commit in 2024.
[Please give Ukraine what they need to bring this war to an end.](https://u24.gov.ua/)
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‘Q’ for the Community:
* What should Ukraine do to stabilize the Donetsk front?
1 Comment
Welcome to the [Peanut Gallery](https://www.nuttyspectacle.com/)! Today we’re going to visit the front line.
Please remember that I know nothing.
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**[Ukraine:](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2024)**
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Howdy folks. It’s been a few days since we last visited Donetsk Oblast and the situation hasn’t improved.
>Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The frontline in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
Damn, ISW, no lube no nothing. They just rammed that paragraph home.
All right, so shit’s fucked. Now I guess it’s a question of degrees. Reading further I would describe the situation as “slightly fucked”, not totally, nor even close to totally, but the situation in Donetsk Oblast is deteriorating and it’s doing so without some corresponding development. IE: there isn’t a reason why Ukraine should be retreating, such as a shortage of artillery shells or a delay of Western aid, so the fact that they are speaks to a deeper underlining problem with the Ukrainian armed forces. I hate to say it, but Russia may be gaining the upper hand in Donetsk Oblast.
Why, ISW? Why is this happening?
>Russian forces’ advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely the result of the discovery and tactical exploitation of vulnerabilities in Ukraine’s lines. Russian forces have been making gradual, tactical advances in southeastern Ukraine since Fall 2024.
Ukraine’s defenses are mostly ad-hoc and a result of location they find themselves at any given point in the line. They didn’t choose the ground they’re holding, they were pushed to it, so their defenses aren’t like the Surovikhin Line or the Maginot Line. They’re what Ukraine could throw together when pressed. And there are holes, sometimes big sometimes small, and it’s these holes Russia is exploiting to gain small tactical advantages. Enough of these tactical advantages add up and they become strategic threats.
What sort of strategic threat? Well it all has to do with the Kurakhove salient. Kurakhove is a Ukrainian redoubt northeast of Vuhledar and west of Donetsk. [To follow along for the next section I recommend the ISW’s interactive map.](https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/36a7f6a6f5a9448496de641cf64bd375) It’ll make your life easier.
Russia’s recent conquest of Selydove ([here’s the map] (https://www.google.com/maps/place/Selydove/data=!4m2!3m1!1s0x40de24a41257df91:0x8c47a64c172c507b?sa=X&ved=1t:242&ictx=111)) and the recent Russian advances south of Andriivka ([here’s the map](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Andriivka,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine,+85540/@48.044461,37.0110803,11.75z/data=!4m6!3m5!1s0x40de1094e1e425bd:0x76ef94d9f4c2770e!8m2!3d48.0189831!4d37.0587716!16s%2Fg%2F1223kjf4?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTExOS4yIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D)) have the ISW worried about the long term health of the defense of the region. In today’s edition they outlined three threats to the Ukrainians in the Donetsk region.
>Threat One: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing the area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka.
Velyka Novosilka is a Ukrainian redoubt to the south of Kurakhove. [Here’s the map.](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Velyka+Novosilka,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine,+85500/@47.84074,36.8278303,12.5z/data=!4m6!3m5!1s0x40ddfd48f19a800d:0xb93935ac788316b9!8m2!3d47.8359616!4d36.8448462!16s%2Fm%2F011f566j?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTExOS4yIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D) It’s been the front lines for quite some time now, and the Russians have experienced some real trouble piercing through its defenses. They just can’t seem to break it, so they’re trying to go around.
Russia is going around by targeting Rozdolne, a tiny hamlet to the northeast. Its fall would present three realities.
1. The fall of Rozdolne threatens the envelopment of Velyka Novosilka, potentially necessitating its retreat.
2. Rozdolne acts as the gateway to the H-15 highway.
3. Rozdolne straddles the T-05-18 road feeding into Velyka Novosilka. Its loss would make supplying Velyka Novosilka far more difficult.
Of the two I think threatening the H-15 highway is the more pressing threat. It feeds Kurakhove and Russia gaining control of it would necessitate the retreat of everything east of Andriivka.
Speaking of Andriivka.
>Threat Two: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south in support of Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the frontline.
Yeah, today’s a FUN episode.
[Here’s Andriivka on a map.](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Andriivka,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine,+85540/@48.044461,37.0110803,11.75z/data=!4m6!3m5!1s0x40de1094e1e425bd:0x76ef94d9f4c2770e!8m2!3d48.0189831!4d37.0587716!16s%2Fg%2F1223kjf4?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTExOS4yIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D) It’s part of a trio of settlements to the west of Kurakhove and north of Velyka Novosilka. It also straddles the H-15 highway, which, as we were just talking about, is an artery into Kurakhove.
Russia wouldn’t have to fight all the way to Andriivka to force a retreat out of Kurakhove. Just taking Roslyv, a little to the south, would gain them control over the H-15 highway and put any defense to the east on extremely tenuous footing.
That said, there’s a reason Russia hasn’t been successful in these efforts before, and it’s because the path to Andriivka is covered in mines. It would be extremely difficult for the Russian army to cross such open terrain, and the coming winter storms will turn the fields to a muddy soup. Armored vehicles are likely to remain useless in such conditions.
But if the south fails there’s always a pincer from the north.
>Threat Three: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes.
[Here’s the map to Selydove.](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Selydove,+Donetsk+Oblast,+Ukraine,+85400/@48.1870682,37.2875668,10.75z/data=!4m6!3m5!1s0x40de24a41257df91:0x8c47a64c172c507b!8m2!3d48.1475145!4d37.297136!16zL20vMGR0NzFk?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MTExOS4yIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D) It essentially generates the northern half of the threat towards the Kurakhove salient. ISW is afraid this grouping will throw all sense to the wind and charge west towards Avdiivka to gain complete control over the H-15 highway and cutoff retreat from Kurakhove.
This one I think is the least likely threat. Getting to Andriivka requires cutting through several hamlets, from a single vector of attack, to lay siege to a large settlement. If they ever come close to threatening Andriivka, Ukraine will have pulled out of Kurakhove and collapsed the pocket themselves.
>The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational maneuver to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances
Small Russian advances are to be expected. Ukraine isn’t attacking, only defending, so the story will always be one of gradual retreat. It’s the nature of a purely defensive strategy.
Ukraine’s win condition is and always has been the destruction of the Russian state. This corrosive strategy they’ve adopted is meant to optimize the ratio of damage, to trade meterage for lives and treasure, and that doesn’t mean squandering strength over pointless attacks. When Ukraine yields a town, it’s often destroyed, little better than a field in terms of tactical utility. There’s no point in dying to reclaim it.
This war will end when Russia is unable to prosecute it further. Putin will either run out of people, or tanks, or his financial state will collapse. Those are Ukraine’s win conditions, and all signs point to Ukraine getting close. Russia is at max employment; Russian interest rates are 21%; and Russia’s Soviet-era stockpiles are running dangerously low. Keep hope. Ukraine will win this war.
——————————————————————————————————
>Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Head off the Department of Combating Crimes Committed in Conditions of Armed Conflict, Yuri Bilousov, reported on November 1 that Russian forces have executed at least 109 Ukrainian POWs since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and that Russian forces have intensified the number of POW executions they commit in 2024.
[Please give Ukraine what they need to bring this war to an end.](https://u24.gov.ua/)
——————————————————————————————————
‘Q’ for the Community:
* What should Ukraine do to stabilize the Donetsk front?
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* Join the conversation on /r/TheNuttySpectacle!