Der Präsident, der sich nie für eine Seite entschieden hat: Indonesiens Präsident Jokowi zeigte, wie asiatische Länder die Rivalität zwischen den USA und China umgehen können

[SS from essay by Ben Bland, Director of the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House and the author of Man of Contradictions: Joko Widodo and the Struggle to Remake Indonesia.]

On October 20, Joko Widodo—universally known as Jokowi—will leave office as the most effective and admired of Indonesia’s five presidents since the country’s turn to democracy in 1998. Over the course of a decade leading the world’s third most populous democracy, Jokowi became best known for his domestic achievements: he bent Indonesia’s cacophonous and sometimes corrupt political elites to his will, drummed up tens of billions of dollars of foreign investment in airport, railway, and mineral-processing projects, and expanded the public’s access to health care and education. These improvements, alongside his humble origin story and straightforward communication style, helped make him incredibly popular: he is leaving office with an approval rating of 75 percent, rendering him one of the democratic world’s most well-liked leaders.

Less understood but equally consequential is the way Jokowi has shifted Indonesia’s foreign policy. For decades, Indonesia’s leaders tried to weave a path between great powers, often considering independence and nonalignment philosophical ends in themselves. Influenced by his experience as a furniture manufacturer and then the mayor of a midsize Indonesian city, Jokowi pivoted from his predecessors’ more rigid style and made a different approach—a uniquely practical and transactional one—his lodestar. He reframed Indonesia’s foreign policy as the art of the deal, bucking the expectation that developing countries must signal their choice between China and the United States. Polls of Asian policymakers and business elites [often pose the question](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-losing-southeast-asia): “If your country were forced to align itself with one of these strategic rivals, which should it choose?” Jokowi consistently refused to make or account for such a binary choice, openly partnering with China to build up Indonesia’s infrastructure and industrial base, cutting business deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and engaging Iran and Russia in trade talks—all while continuing to maintain strong relations with the United States and Europe.