Wie ein russischer Spion in der Schweiz Material für die Herstellung chemischer Waffen beschaffte | Deutscher Artikel, Übersetzung unten

https://www.watson.ch/international/schweiz/462297520-russe-beschafft-material-fuer-chemiewaffen-in-der-schweiz

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    Translated article:

    >__A Russian diplomat procured precision ammunition and laboratory equipment in Switzerland, operating as a military agent. In spring 2024, Swiss counterintelligence conducted raids – yet the goods remain unaccounted for.__

    >Igor Sergeyevich Skryabin entered Switzerland as administrative and technical staff – essentially a diplomatic assistant. This was, at least, the job title the Russian Federation registered with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA).

    >According to investigations by the Tagesanzeiger, Skryabin had successfully graduated from the Military Academy in Novosibirsk, Russia. The academy trains members of the Russian Air Force as well as special units of the GRU military intelligence service. Skryabin (or a man with the same name) reportedly gave a lecture on underwater weaponry there in 2010.

    >The Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) quickly realised after reviewing his accreditation that the Russian had not come to Switzerland for diplomatic reasons but was affiliated with the GRU military intelligence service. Consequently, the FIS began surveilling Skryabin.

    >__Ammunition Deal in Bern__

    >Igor Sergeyevich Skryabin took up a position in the Trade Representation in Bern – away from Russian diplomatic hubs like the UN mission in Geneva or the embassy in Bern. Near his workplace, the GRU maintains its unofficial headquarters for German-speaking Switzerland.

    >In autumn 2023, after work, the Russian occasionally headed south instead of going back to his apartment in the east of the city. There, he met with a local arms dealer in the car park of a shopping centre. The Swiss man handed the GRU agent primarily sniper ammunition, which could be used for assassinations.

    >However, new information from the Tagesanzeiger suggests that Skryabin’s dealings went beyond this. He made further dubious acquisitions outside Bern.

    >As the FIS had insufficient resources for surveillance extending to northwestern Switzerland – where Skryabin frequently travelled – they requested support from the Basel regional police corps in late 2023.

    >__Laboratory Equipment Deal in the Basel Region__

    >During a joint counterintelligence operation, Basel police officers discovered that Skryabin had been regularly meeting with a laboratory equipment seller for months. These meetings took place not at the seller’s workplace – a store for chemical apparatus and other lab accessories that cannot legally be exported to Russia or other conflict zones – but again in a car park or other discreet locations around Basel.

    >Basel police and the FIS observed as the seller transferred boxes from his car into the Russian agent’s vehicle, with Skryabin in return giving him cash.

    >While these encounters have been documented by Swiss counterintelligence, the exact items exchanged remain unknown. Nonetheless, Skryabin’s acquisitions included potentially dangerous lab equipment alongside the precision ammunition. As a result, the FIS involved the Federal Prosecutor’s Office. Niels Eckmann, head of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office’s State Security Division, initiated two investigations: one concerning the ammunition in Bern, and another regarding the lab equipment in the Basel region.

    >__Raids in Bern and Northwestern Switzerland__

    >In late spring 2024, raids were conducted in multiple cantons by the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Criminal Police, and cantonal police corps. The searches included the arms dealer’s business and residence in Bern, as well as the lab equipment company in northwestern Switzerland. Two seized folders reportedly documented the sale of a cooling unit and a centrifuge to Skryabin. According to the FIS, such devices can be used to produce chemical or biological weapons.

    >The Russian brought the goods to the Trade Representation in Bern – just as he did with the sniper ammunition. However, consular buildings can only be entered by Swiss authorities with permission, meaning Skryabin’s workplace could not be searched. It thus remains unclear where the acquired equipment and ammunition are currently located.

    >After the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs requested that Russia withdraw Skryabin, the Russian left Bern and returned to Moscow. Although he was not declared a persona non grata in Switzerland – a measure often used by other states – the Federal Prosecutor’s Office has been authorised by the Federal Council to proceed with the two criminal investigations.

    >As reported by the Tagesanzeiger, the Russian embassy in Bern states it wishes “to emphasise that the embassy staff are exclusively engaged in fostering constructive dialogue with Swiss authorities and promoting Russian-Swiss relations.”

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