Hallo, ich bin ein unabhängiger spanischer Journalist. Normalerweise mache ich Dokumentationen und Videos über Konflikte und soziale Themen. Ich werde hier auch den Link zu meinem YouTube-Kanal anhängen. Ich war mehrere Male im Kaukasus und insbesondere zweimal in Georgien. Ich habe überlegt, eine Dokumentation über die kommenden Wahlen im Oktober zu machen. Ich möchte sowohl die prorussische als auch die proeuropäische Ideologie zeigen. Wenn ich ehrlich bin, bin ich, obwohl ich beide verstehen möchte, gegenüber der EU voreingenommen. Ich habe einige Fragen, um die gegenwärtige georgische Politik besser zu verstehen.
- Werden die Wahlen als pro-russisch gegen pro-europäische Wahlen angesehen?
- Werden von jetzt an bis zum Wahltermin noch weitere pro-russische Gesetze verabschiedet?
- Gibt es Teile des Landes, die eindeutig pro-russisch oder pro-EU sind, oder ist die Haltung überall gemischt? (Abchasien und Südossetien natürlich nicht mitgerechnet)
- Welche praktischen Auswirkungen hat das Gesetz über ausländische Agenten?
- Kennen Sie Organisationen oder Aktivisten, mit denen es sich für die Dokumentation zu sprechen lohnt?
Generell besteht meine Absicht darin, einen Überblick über die aktuelle Politik in Georgien zu bekommen, daher bin ich für alle Informationen dankbar.
Hier der Link zum YouTube-Kanal. Die langen Dokumentationen haben englische Untertitel. https://youtube.com/@blacklistreportajes?si=a44heuEqnv20FWC0
Vielen Dank, Freundliche Grüße
Questions about Georgian politics and elections
byu/George_Nitales inSakartvelo
Von George_Nitales
6 Comments
1. Yes. It is almost like a choice between fear and hope. Russia is fear, EU is hope.
2. Unlikely, but it won’t matter much. The gov already proved to everyone that they are betting on Russia. Everyone knows: most hate that bet, few fear it might be a necessary evil.
3. Mixed. The Soviet “inteligentsia” (the brain elite) sitting in prestigious areas of Tbilisi always licks the boots of the current power holder. The regions being more independent from that but less politically savvy, thus more manipulatable by red herrings like the LGBT topic.
4. It demonizes the Western-financed organizations in civil, media and political spheres. It gives the gov tools to ramp up propaganda in the future against any sophisticated opposition.
5. Not specific, but if you reach out the main NGOs like Transparency International Georgia, the GYLA, etc, they should be happy to talk to you.
There are also parties who don’t want nor north nor west (ru/eu), they are kinda nationalistic but in a good way, with other plans and ideologies, but they don’t get enough recognition. Probably reassembling a little bit to “brexit movement” when England decided to self-isolate but keeping ties with everyone, not like north Korea for example.
1. Elections are viewed in a way that there isn’t a single candidate anyone likes, all of them are viewed with extreme level of disdain and suspicion by most people due to past actions. That being said there is a clear idea that voting for Georgian dream is a vote for drift towards further authoritarianism and Russian and Chinese sphere.
2. Who knows? GD has been quiet.
3. It is mixed, that being said it is more accurate to say that there are regions that are slightly more scared to lose traditional Georgian identity through fears of “western influence”, GD plays on this a lot because it knows that there are more people that have this fear than people who actually like GD. For example Adjara is relatively much more on the fence from anecdotal interactions I’ve had. That being said you will be hard pressed to find any Georgian region that feels like events that transpired during the dissolution of the USSR were not the fault of the Russian state.
4. It is vague enough with enough leg room that it can be used as a blank law to pressure all NGOs and extract private information. There are possible very bizarre cases like the government potentially being able to get private information of any citizen student that participated in any foreign program including something like Erasmus.
5. I heavily suggest talking to all of them. General representatives of president, of GD, of national movement, of Girchi 36 and Girchi Droa. That being said you are much more likely to get interesting responses from the likes of Girchi.
To everything that was said, i will add this to your question 3: according to nationwide polls (ndi for example), i think all ethnic minorities tend to be more pro-russia than average popultion. Thus kvemo kartli and javakheti id presume are more supportive if GD
1. Yes that’s becoming the primary issue among the electorate though the situation is much more complex than that. Bear in mind Georgian Dream (the incumbents) are not an overtly pro-Russian party, nobody could take that position in Georgia given the occupied territories. They have a public policy position that is pro EU and pro Euro Atlantic integration, and many of their rank and file have been sincerely working towards those ends also. The top of the party / Bidzina has been (in my opinion) acting to sabotage those ambitions for some time but still today if you ask Georgian Dream their policy position they’re pro-EU and in favour of Georgia becoming a member state.
2. Hard to say but see above. The Georgian public (including Georgian Dream supporters) are overwhelmingly not pro-Russian in the way I think you mean.. There’s public debate around how adversarial the relationship with Russia should be – should visa-free be allowed or should trade be open – but pro-Russian in the sense of supporting the invasion of Ukraine or approving of Putin would be an extremely fringe view in Georgia.. Georgian Dream supporters are not aligned with the party because they’re pro-Russian but rather because they believe the party also isn’t and are taking a pragmatic approach to Russia relations to avoid war, or at least they care about other things more.
3. No, nothing like that. Georgian Dream are stronger in the regions due to a regional patronage system but if you mean equivalent to say Donetsk there is nothing like that in Georgia – there are no Russian speaking areas and everyone is proudly Georgian and believes Georgia should be independent.
4. Again hard to say but the most obvious effect is that western funded NGOs and media orgs – who have already said they won’t register – will receive less or no funding and many will cease to exist because there are laws about covert funding in the west. Russia has no such scruples and will continue to fund under the table – see the offshore law that came into effect at the same time as the foreign agents law to enable this. Beyond that a specific reason for this law is to dampen independent polling, that is supremely important in Georgia because the regions back the perceived winners rather than vote idealogically so controlling the narrative around who has a majority is very important.
5. Not sure but I’d maybe try to get comment from TI, that’s an NGO with the international standing and reputation to make a point but also extremely localized presence for many years to understand what’s really happening in Georgia.
1. Viewed by whom?
2. Possible and probable
3. No
4. Nothing. That law is so stupid that it is not enforceable without shutting down Western Union money transfers that almost the whole Georgian economy depends on
5. Misha & Bidzina