Add this to the Spratly islands (Philippines), and Taiwan (US/Taiwan) conflicts too. The period 2028-2032 would be an interesting time to watch- (1) modernization of the armed forces should be near completion (2) Jinping would be in his late 70s and before he turns too old, (3) PLA would be at their peak numbers (before they start dropping due to aging population), (4) Jinping hopes they’d be out of the current economic mess they are in -containing internal strife.
SolRon25 on
SS: Leading up to the war in 1962, the Indian government under Nehru made a series of assumptions that left the Indian military underprepared along the border with China. The assumption was that China wouldn’t go to war with India, and even if there was conflict, it would be low grade and localised. The result was that when China conducted a massive offensive along the border, the civilian leadership was stunned, and the unprepared military crumbled, handing India a humiliating loss.
Coming to the present day, the author notes that similar assumptions were made by the current Indian leadership about China. This resulted with no one in the establishment expecting the PLA to occupy large sections of the border in the early days of May 2020. The subsequent fatal clashes at Galwan would further shock the government, which started taking steps to improve the military posture along the border. That being said, the author notes that the present course relies on the assumption that China wouldn’t engage in full scale conflict with India, an assumption that author calls risky at best and dangerous at worst. With a confluence of factors aligning to make India vulnerable both politically and militarily, the risk of a massive attack by China is at an all time high.
PlusAd423 on
A full scale war between two states with nukes, no way.
3 Comments
Add this to the Spratly islands (Philippines), and Taiwan (US/Taiwan) conflicts too. The period 2028-2032 would be an interesting time to watch- (1) modernization of the armed forces should be near completion (2) Jinping would be in his late 70s and before he turns too old, (3) PLA would be at their peak numbers (before they start dropping due to aging population), (4) Jinping hopes they’d be out of the current economic mess they are in -containing internal strife.
SS: Leading up to the war in 1962, the Indian government under Nehru made a series of assumptions that left the Indian military underprepared along the border with China. The assumption was that China wouldn’t go to war with India, and even if there was conflict, it would be low grade and localised. The result was that when China conducted a massive offensive along the border, the civilian leadership was stunned, and the unprepared military crumbled, handing India a humiliating loss.
Coming to the present day, the author notes that similar assumptions were made by the current Indian leadership about China. This resulted with no one in the establishment expecting the PLA to occupy large sections of the border in the early days of May 2020. The subsequent fatal clashes at Galwan would further shock the government, which started taking steps to improve the military posture along the border. That being said, the author notes that the present course relies on the assumption that China wouldn’t engage in full scale conflict with India, an assumption that author calls risky at best and dangerous at worst. With a confluence of factors aligning to make India vulnerable both politically and militarily, the risk of a massive attack by China is at an all time high.
A full scale war between two states with nukes, no way.
China hasn’t been in a war since 1979.